讲座题目：Supply Chain Performance under Yield Ambiguity: Overconfident Price Competition
主 讲 人：华南理工大学 钟远光 教授
主 持 人：中南大学商学院 周艳菊 教授
摘 要：We investigate how overconfidence bias would affect members—a supplier and two competing retailers—in a supply chain under yield ambiguity. We consider a setting where the distributional information of the random yield is limited and is only characterized by the support, mean, and variance. We study two types of overconfidence, named, respectively, overestimation that the decision-maker overestimates the mean of the random yield and overprecision that the decision-maker underestimates its variability. Using a distribution-free approach, we obtain closed-form equilibrium solutions of all six cases wherein the supplier and retailers could be overconfident. Comparative studies highlight the impacts of the two types of overconfidence: although these two overconfident behaviors have significantly different effects on the equilibrium, they both reduce double marginalization and can lead to the first-best outcome in the centralized, non-competing, and unbiased system. Besides, we also find that (i) overprecision always benefits the supplier; (ii) overprecision and overestimation of the retailers do not necessarily hurt themselves; (iii) theSupplier’s overprecision has no effect on the chain members while her overestimation hurts all parties in the supply chain, and (iv) although competition between retailers can enhance the performance of chain members, overconfidence may weaken such a positive effect. Our results caution the decision-makers thatoverconfidence of a specific chain member (i.e., supplier or retailer) can have completely different impacts. In addition, overconfidence can be a positive drive for the chain members in the presence of retailer competition.